What is the relationship between foreign manufacturing multinational corporations (MNCs) and the expansion of indigenous technological and managerial technological capabilities among Chinese firms? China has been remarkably successful in designing industrial policies, joint venture requirements, and technology transfer pressures to use FDI to create indigenous national champions in a handful of prominent sectors: high speed rail transport, information technology, auto assembly, and an emerging civil aviation sector. But what is striking in the aggregate data is how relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous Chinese firms has proven to be. Despite the large size of manufacturing FDI inflows, the impact of multinational corporate investment in China has been largely confined to building plants that incorporate capital, technology, and managerial expertise controlled by the foreigner. As the skill-intensity of exports increases, the percentage of the value of the final product that derives from imported components rises sharply. China has remained a low value-added assembler of more sophisticated inputs imported from abroad-a "workbench" economy. Where do the gains from FDI in China end up? While manufacturing MNCs may build plants in China, the largest impact from deployment of worldwide earnings is to bolster production, employment, R&D, and local purchases in their home markets. For the United States the most recent data show that US-headquartered MNCs have 70 percent of their operations, make 89 percent of their purchases, spend 87 percent of their R&D dollars, and locate more than half of their workforce within the US economy-this is where most of the earnings from FDI in China are delivered. But what is striking in the aggregate data is how relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous Chinese firms-and consequent export externalities-has proven to be.
payments for materials and labor used in the operations of the foreign plants (domestic value-added in foreign-owned plants). 4 China has been remarkably successful in designing industrial policies, joint venture requirements, and technology transfer pressures to use FDI via channels 1, 2, and 3 to create indigenous national champions in a handful of prominent sectors: high speed rail transport, information technology, auto assembly, and an emerging civil aviation sector. Prominent North American, European, Japanese, and Korean manufacturing multinationals rightly fear that they may find themselves launching rivals to their own market position when they weigh access to the vast Chinese market against technology acquisition and management imitation on the part of Chinese partners and other indigenous competitors. Bringing in new technology to gain access to the Chinese market-whether for domestic market penetration or as a base for exports-may therefore often appear to individual foreign multinationals as making a Faustian bargain with the devil. "China can strike deals," asserts Steven Pearlstein, "that may provide short-term profits to one company and its shareholders but in the long run undermine the competitiveness of the other country's economy." 5 But what is striking in the aggregate data is how relatively thin the layer of horizontal and vertical spillovers from foreign manufacturing multinationals to indigenous Chinese firms-and consequent export externalities-has proven to be.
Despite the large size of manufacturing FDI inflows, the impact of multinational corporate investment in China has been largely confined to the fourth dimension, building plants that incorporate capital, technology, and managerial expertise controlled by the foreigner. Within this foreign firm-dominated production array, FDI payments for Chinese materials and labor used in the operations of the foreign plants have increased as domestic value-added has increased, but such increase in domestic value-added has been concentrated at the lesser-skilled end of the export frontier. From a comparative perspective, the share of domestic value-added in FDI operations in China in high skill-intensive sectors such as computers and telecommunications ranges from less than one-half to slightly more than one-half of what is found in other developing countries where comparable measurements can be made, such as Mexico.
Across the expanse of the Chinese domestic economy, the accumulated evidence simply does not show FDI to be a powerful source for indigenous-controlled industrial transformation. In the case of exports, the production of increasingly sophisticated goods destined for international markets from China 4. There is a fifth channel for potential benefits from manufacturing FDI: foreign investors may offer compensation premia and training premia in their own plants; they may or may not also generate labor market externalities and labor institution externalities that affect other firms as well. While the evidence shows that MNCs pay workers a wage-premium in China, as elsewhere, FDI and labor market impacts in the Chinese economy are not thoroughly explored in this paper.
5. Steven Pearlstein. 2011. "China is following the same old script-the one that gives it all the best lines." The Washington Post, p. A-11. January 19, 2011. has been remarkably well constrained to and contained within the plants owned and controlled by foreign multinationals and their international suppliers. China has remained a low value-added assembler of more sophisticated inputs imported from abroad-a "workbench" economy largely bereft of the magnified benefits and externalities from FDI enjoyed by other developing countries. What appear to be the explanations and reasons for this relatively tepid infusion of technology and management into Chinese firms in a horizontal or vertical direction are explored below.
II. mAnufAcTurIng mulTInATIOnAls And hOrIzOnTAl/verTIcAl spIllOvers TO chInese fIrms, wITh expOrT exTernAlITIes, In heAdlIne IndusTrIes
Recent controversy about "indigenous innovation" policies is only the most recent manifestation of Beijing's determination to use the lure of participation in the rapidly growing Chinese market-whether as a base for domestic sales or as a site for exports-to pressure foreign manufacturing multinationals to transfer industry best practices to Chinese partners and other Chinese firms in certain target industries.
high speed railroad Transport
In high speed railroad transport, the State Council, Ministry of Railroads, and state-owned train builders In less than four years of "digestion", CSR mastered and improved what it received from Kawasaki, finally cancelling its cooperation agreement. According to Zhang Chenghong, the president of CSR , CSR "made the bold move of forming a systemic development platform for high-speed locomotives and further upgrading its design and manufacturing technology. Later, we began to independently develop 
Aerospace
In aerospace, China similarly uses access to the Chinese market plus an informal "offset" policy to gain access to aviation technology and production expertise. Early in 2005, for example, China approached Airbus seeking an Airbus final assembly line to be built in China, and later in the same year signed a purchase order to import 150 Airbus A320s, worth approximately $10 billion.
7 Eighteen months Airbus later set up a joint venture company to assemble the A320 in Tianjin, and an Airbus spokesman acknowledged a quid pro quo. Chinese surplus in ATP goods in China-US bilateral trade-leads to speculation that China might be "leapfrogging" ahead technologically. US-exported ATP products and China-exported ATP products falls between 1 and 10 times greater for the US ATP exports to China, one-third falls between 10 and 100 times greater for the US ATP exports to China, and more than 13 percent are at least 100 times greater for the US ATP exports to China.
In some categories, China simultaneously imports and exports the same product-for example, microscopes-but the types imported from the US cost ten to twenty times more than the types exported to the US, suggesting a sizable difference in features and capabilities. Linden, Kraemer, and Dedrick conclude that "the value added to the product through assembly in China is probably a few dollars at most" (the popularly accepted figure is $4). They argue that while
Apple's margins are high within the electronics sector, the "geography" of value-capture for the iPod is fairly representative for the industry. 24 Robert Koopman, Shi Wang, and Shang-Jin Wei support this contention with their finding that Japan, the United States, and Europe (EU15) are the main sources of foreign content for computers and electronics in China, accounting for about 60 percent of imported components.
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In 2010, Yuqing Xing and Neal Detert undertook a similar calculation of the value-capture in China in assembly of Apple's iPhone. 26 They find that the value-added in China in 2009 for the iPhone was $6.50 per unit, which was 3.6 percent of the total shipping price of the phone.
At the end of the day, China's high tech export explosion represents multinational corporations bringing high skill-content high value-added inputs into China, assembling them into final products (or semi-assembled intermediates), and exporting them to world markets. 27 The contemporary corpus of sophisticated research on the evolution of China's export base concludes that the increase in skill content at the sophisticated end of Chinese exports since 1992 is largely due to the increased skill content of imported inputs that are then assembled for export.
Somewhat surprisingly, moreover, the expansion of Chinese high tech exports is taking place along the intensive margin rather than the extensive margin. 28 In other developing countries, one of the principal contributions of foreign manufacturing investment is to continuously diversify the host export profile. This has clearly happened in China in the past, peaking around 1996, but from then on In their dissection of the "value-capture flows" for Apple's iPod, summarized earlier, Greg Linden, Kenneth L. Kraemer, and Jason Dedrick suggest that the value-added attributed to the parent company that contributes a component or performs an integrative function to a product in China flows directly back to MNC headquarters. This is almost surely too simplistic-especially for US MNCs-given the American territorial tax system with the foreign tax credit and deferral that encourage US MNCs to use transfer pricing to keep accumulations of earnings offshore.
Rather than try to track down capital flows and hiding places within integrated MNC networks, the more sensible approach is to ask a slightly different kind of question: if MNC headquarters use earnings from China, like earnings from elsewhere, to fortify their corporate position in world markets, what kinds of activities will those earnings help maintain or expand, and where will they be located?
In coming to an answer for this question, it is striking to note-even in today's globalized worldhow remarkably home-based MNCs from developed countries have remained. The home-market-centered orientation for MNCs across the developed world is not dissimilar. In poorer developing countries horizontal spillovers often come via the movement of workers and managers. A World Bank study found that within six years of the beginnings of FDI-led growth in
Mauritius, fifty percent of the investments in Export Processing Zones originated in domestic companies set up by owners who had learned their skills in foreign owned plants. 37 In Ghana, Holger Gorg and Eric
Strobl trace a similar movement whereby managers move from foreign-owned plants to establish their own firms in the same industry.
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In addition to the "leakage" of managers and workers, survey data from middle-income developing countries identify imitation of production techniques and marketing strategies as an important channel of vertical spillovers. Looking first at the horizontal relationship between multinational investment and the TFP performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, Sourafel Girma and Yundan Gong find that within any given region the average SOE experiences negative intra-industry spillovers from the foreign multinational presence. 40 Besides suffering from market-stealing effects on the part of foreign firms, SOEs appear to find their more productive workers and managers moving to foreign investor companies where average wages are nearly 16 percent higher.
Turning to the horizontal relationship between foreign investors and private Chinese firms, with an extremely large industrial survey of more than 600,000 firms, Galina Hale, Cheryl Long, and Hirotaka Miura find that the impact of FDI varies by industry, sometimes with statistically significant positive effects, other times with statistically significant negative effects. 41 Overall they estimate that the horizontal effects from FDI are either zero or quite small. Of particular note, they find no measurable horizontal The prominence of the joint-venture channel for whatever horizontal spillovers take place in China has important implications for the quality of technology, management, and marketing available for domestic Chinese firms. Chinese policymakers at the national and provincial level have informally-and for some sectors formally-encouraged or required that foreign investors set up operation with a Chinese partner or undertake other actions that ensure technology transfer into the Chinese economy. As noted earlier in the body of the paper, current Chinese "pillar industry" policies that give preference to firms doing R&D within China are only the latest iteration. Looking at technology sharing policies beyond joint venture requirements, Magnus Blomstrom, Ari
Kokko, and Mario Zejan uncover a negative correlation between host policies that stipulate foreign investors must provide access to the parents' patents, perform research and development (R&D)
in-country, or use the most advanced production processes available, and actual technology inflows into the host country. 47 When host authorities require technology-sharing as a condition of entry for Japanese investors, Shujiro Urata and Hiroki Kawai observe a negative coefficient for intra-firm technology transfer.
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The evidence for China fits this same pattern. ownership requirements, in short, hinders foreign affiliates from reaching the technological frontier in China, as elsewhere.
So even in those cases where horizontal spillovers can be observed in China, the channel-via joint ventures-is not likely to be as potent in placing Chinese firms along the cutting edge of technology and management in a given industry as is taking place in Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brazil, Mexico, or India where wholly-owned foreign MNC operations are the norm.
There is a marked contrast in the results from Chinese use of industrial policy, joint venture and other technology transfer demands, local content requirements, and preferred public procurement in the handful of important high profile industries examined earlier in the body of this paper, and the Chinese economy more broadly.
fdI And verTIcAl spIllOvers In chInA
In contrast to the horizontal direction, multinational manufacturers have a self-interest in creating vertical
supplier networks. Comparative analysis shows that multinational manufacturers do not just to search out indigenous input suppliers where they operate but that they provide potential suppliers with technical assistance and other often-uncompensated help with lowering costs and enhancing quality.
The creation of MNC-host firm vertical relationships involve more than mere shopping-around for cheap inputs. Manufacturing MNC supplier networks often feature an intimacy and intensity-including two-way interaction, customization, and real-time mutual upgrading of technology and quality controlthat is far different from impersonal arms-length purchase contracts.
Beginning in the early days of export-led growth in SE Asia in the 1980s, firm-level research on foreign investors in the electronics sector in Singapore reported that US and European firms provided engineering help to indigenous firms to enable them to meet precise design specifications. 50 Firm-level investigations in the telecommunications and semiconductor industries in Malaysia documented how MNCs assigned technicians to suppliers' plants to assist them in setting up large-volume production and quality control procedures. 51 One study of nine Japanese electronics multinationals tracked "deliberate transfers" to Malaysian suppliers in the form of new product and process technologies, product-design specifications, advice on the use of equipment, and help with the solution of specific technical problems.
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These kinds of assistance to local firms could not be considered a genuine externality to the host economy if the recipients remained as "captive suppliers" to those who provided the help, but in both Singapore and Malaysia the indigenous firms used the knowledge they acquired to become "contract manufacturers"
to the electronics industry more generally. In the Singapore case, the multinationals introduced local suppliers to affiliates of the same parent in neighboring economies, following which the suppliers began to export more widely on their own (an export externality)-as discussed in the next section (Section IV) of this paper.
Efforts on the part of foreign multinationals to develop supplier networks in the host economy extend beyond Southeast Asia and the electronics industry. In the automotive sector, Wilson Perez Nunez reports that within five years after the international auto investors began to use Mexico as an export platform more than half of the thirty largest auto part exporters (excluding engines) were indigenous firms. 53 The Mexican affiliates of US, European, and Japanese auto investors helped these local companies improve quality control to the point where they could undergo certification as Original Equipment
Manufacturers (OEM). In Thailand, Archanun Kohpaiboon finds that multinational automakers assigned technicians to take up residence in supplier factories. 54 Backward linkages and spillovers in Thailand came in tiers. The first tier of fully-certified OEM suppliers includes 287affiliates of international auto-parts manufacturers, plus 10 Thai-owned firms. Among the latter, engineers at two companies (Somboon Group and Summit Auto Body) reported that Mitsubishi showed the owners how to purchase and install used-equipment from Japan and Germany, respectively, to meet Mitsubishi standards. The second tier is made up of approximately 1,000 Thai-owned companies that supply the first tier and the primary foreign assemblers. For the second tier, the foreign investors provide help with setting up testing facilities to ensure quality reliability.
The desire of foreign manufacturers to develop local supplier networks shows China is no exception.
Firm level survey data of foreign investors from the US and UK in the eastern seaboard of China from 2003 indicate that some seventy-four percent have dedicated search initiatives to find local suppliers, and active vendor-development programs. 55 These foreign investors-almost three-quarters of those surveyed-provide explicit support for restructuring suppliers' production processes, improving storage and transport facilities and capabilities, and training suppliers' staff in production methods and quality assurance techniques. The survey results from UK investors (representing more than half of the total population of UK investors in the eastern seaboard provinces of China) identified a specific "human resource" barrier to supplier development. 56 The UK affiliates reported that poor quality or late delivery were not in themselves considered reason for breaking a relationship with a supplier, at least in the initial stage of a relationship-the foreign buyers expected such difficulties. Faced with quality or timing issues, the foreign procurement officers would typically respond by helping the Chinese suppliers alter their processes and work practices. What would lead to a deterioration in the foreign-local supplier relationship was when the Chinese firms continually failed to communicate the real problems they faced, or failed to act on the advice and training given by the foreign investor. Suppliers would often not accurately report to buyer firms the problems they faced or would offer misinformation ("supplies wouldn't show up and upon enquiry we would find out that the supplier had changed the schedule due to some problem which was almost definitely not the true reason without letting us know of the change"). 57 The survey data highlight the difficulty of building relationships of trust that depends upon reliable information exchange and an explicit sharing of problems followed by joint resolution-so important for tightly integrated vertical operations and just-in-time delivery systems.
For both US and UK investors the data suggest that soft performance criteria related to "relationship building" were often more difficult to achieve than "hard" performance criteria such as delivery, quality, and adherence to specifications per se. 58 This quasi-cultural inhibitor between Chinese suppliers and US or UK investors may not be so pronounced for the relationship between Chinese suppliers and foreign investment from ethnic Chinese companies, but such observation was outside the scope of this survey. In the universe of private Chinese companies, Galina Hale, Cheryl Long, and Hirotaka Miura find diverse results as foreign investment increases, with more positive than negative effects from FDI to both upstream and downstream domestic firms. 60 Of particular note-once again-is that there is no significant aggregate evidence of vertical spillovers in either the computer or the transportation equipment (including autos) sectors.
These would seem to be rather tepid results for China in comparison to vertical spillovers from FDI in other developing countries, such as Indonesia and Eastern Europe.
When Garrick Blalock and Paul Gertler investigate the relationship between the presence of foreign investors and the total factor productivity of domestic firms that are suppliers to or buyers from the foreigners in Indonesia, they find an improvement in upstream and downstream local firms that is significantly associated with the rise in foreign investment. 61 They are able to show that improvement in the performance of these indigenous firms, in turn, results in lower prices, increased output, higher profitability, and increased entry of vertically-linked firms. Moving beyond mere data correlation, Blalock and Gertler supplement their econometric investigations with survey data from both investors and suppliers. Foreign managers and the Indonesian local company executives reported help with production, quality control and business management flowing from one side to the other. US and Japanese affiliates assisted target suppliers to increase efficiency and reliability, increasing the size of purchases from local firms that showed promise. In the case of Japanese investors, the usual practice was to introduce successful Indonesian suppliers to other members of the parent company group elsewhere in Southeast Asia, an export externality reported earlier and discussed in the next section of this paper.
Similarly, Beata Smarzynska Javorcik finds productivity spillovers from foreign investors to upstream domestic firms in Lithuania. 62 A one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in downstream sectors is associated with a 15 percent increase in output of each domestic firm in supplying industries.
She finds productivity spillovers from foreign investors to affiliates with shared local ownership, but no significant relationship with wholly-owned affiliates (an outcome she associates with the inclination of the latter to import more intermediate inputs).
While these studies that cover China, Indonesia, and Lithuania are quite different in many respects, it is interesting to note that the results from the latter two countries are robust to a large number of specifications while the results from China are more nuanced and are sensitive to sector and type of foreign investor.
As the data from Thailand (above) and from elsewhere show, vertical supplier relationships include foreign component producers that follow the major MNCs into the host economy as well as host country firms. This is true within China too. This could change (it is hard to imagine that Chinese domestic content in the automotive sector, for example, will not expand substantially even if much of the expansion may take place within international component producers).
In comparative perspective, the extent and pace of expansion of backward linkages varies greatly.
Relative success depends, in the first instance, upon a host country business-friendly climate that allows local firms to grow and prosper. It also depends upon how wide is the gap between the capabilities of the local business elite and the sophistication of what is demanded by the foreign purchaser: Ari Kokko shows that spillovers between foreign affiliates and local firms in Mexico varies as a function of the productivity differential between the two. 64 Ari Kokko, Ruben Tansini, and Mario Zejan observe the same phenomenon in Uruguay. 65 The development of indigenous supplier networks also varies as a function of the length of time the foreign investors have been resident in the host country. 66 Axele Giroud and Hafiz
Mirza show that variations in local input linkages in Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia depend upon the age of the local foreign affiliate. 67 Rene Belderbos, Biovanni Capanelli, and Kyoji Fukao find that the proportion of local content purchased by Japanese multinationals from both foreign-owned and indigenous suppliers in a host economy is directly related to the length of Japanese affiliate's operating experience there.
68
Reasonably well-developed local financial institutions appear to be a necessary (if not sufficient) condition to enable local firms to become suppliers to multinationals. Beata S. Javorcik and Mariana Spatareanu find that Czech firms supplying foreign investors tend to be less credit constrained than non-suppliers. While some of these suppliers may be financially privileged via supply contracts, their results show that the supplier base is generally less liquidity-constrained before starting up a relationship with an MNC. Indigenous firms with greater access to credit are more likely to self-select into supplier status. Laura Alfaro, A. Chanda, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, and Selin Sayek provide a formalization of how this process might take place, and Alfaro, Salemi-Ozcan, and Sayek-using data from 72 countries for the period 1975-95-show that countries with better quality financial institutions enjoy improvements in total factor productivity among suppliers and not just more capital accumulation. 69 What seems clear is that broad-based economic development via strong and vibrant supplier relationships with the vast FDI presence in China has not yet taken place in any dramatic way, and difficult and complicated reforms are likely to be required before it does.
fdI And expOrT exTernAlITIes In chInA
Firm and industry-level studies surveyed earlier in this paper show foreign multinationals in countries other than China introducing host country firms to sister affiliates in the region, following which these host firms begin to penetrate international markets more broadly.
In the econometric literature, most investigations of export spillovers from multinational firms examine whether the export probabilities or export volumes of local firms are enhanced by proximity to multinational firms. This is the question Brian Aitken, Gordon Hanson, and Ann Harrison address, in the period after Mexico began to liberalize trade and investment in 1985. 70 Isolating the relationship between the presence of foreign investors and the export behavior of indigenous firms requires deft analysis since the natural expectation is that all export behavior will take place where the infrastructure is best, or where proximity to borders is closest, or where some other comparative advantage benefits all outward-looking firms. To identify an export spill-over from foreign firms, therefore, they control for overall concentration of economic activity in a region, and for possible region-specific or industry-specific shocks, so as to eliminate the impact of unobserved fixed factors that might affect the export behavior of all firms.
Somewhat surprisingly, their results showed that the probability of doing "more-than-expected" exporting was positively correlated with close-by presence of foreign investors but uncorrelated with close-by concentration of export activity more generally. But the positive effect is only present in China's interior provinces.
In the coastal regions of China Chgen and Swensen find that the presence of own-industry MNCs does not lead to new export activity on the part of private Chinese firms whatsoever. 
